When Tajikistan’s finance ministry published its latest external debt summary in March, one figure stood out: 51.4% of all sovereign external obligations are now owed to China’s Export-Import Bank. That share has risen by 14 percentage points since 2019.
The structure of recent loans has also shifted. Where earlier facilities were tied to specific infrastructure projects with clear collateral arrangements, the most recent two — totaling $1.7 billion — are general budget support loans secured against future mineral export revenues.
For analysts, this is the textbook structure of a creditor-debtor relationship in which the debtor’s fiscal autonomy is constrained well beyond the formal terms of the contract. Dushanbe insists the arrangement is mutually beneficial. Beijing, characteristically, says nothing publicly.
The political consequences are starting to show. Tajik officials have notably softened their previously vocal position on Uyghur policy, and last month signed a security cooperation agreement that grants Chinese law enforcement transit rights through three border districts.