Recent months have witnessed a notable acceleration in both official and semi-official exchanges between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This renewed diplomatic traffic, initiated subsequent to a Washington meeting in August 2025, has spurred a cautious interest among regional observers.
Specific high-level interactions underscore this trend. Andranik Simonyan, head of Armenia’s National Security Service, visited Baku for a security forum in September, while Murad Muradov, deputy director of the Topchubashov Center, travelled to Yerevan for the NATO summit the following month. An Azerbaijani delegation also participated in Yerevan’s Orbeli Forum in November, indicating a broader spectrum of engagement.
Parallel to these official overtures, discussions involving what were described as Armenian and Azerbaijani civil society representatives took place. A meeting in Yerevan in October, followed by a reciprocal visit of Armenian representatives to Baku in November, aimed to foster a peace agenda. However, their independent mandate remains a point of analytical scrutiny.
What differentiates these recent encounters from past initiatives is the unprecedented openness with which they have been received, particularly within Azerbaijan. Public social media posts by participants and widespread coverage in state and pro-government media have presented these interactions as significant advancements.
Kamala Mammadova, a journalist from 1news.az, articulated this perspective, highlighting the current format’s purported bilateralism, devoid of intermediaries or external influence. This, she suggested, fostered a "genuine interest of both parties in the dialogue," signalling a shift from earlier, less fruitful engagements.
Yet, this assessment overlooks critical historical context. Previous attempts at cross-border dialogue failed primarily due to a lack of genuine support from state authorities. The marginalisation of peace promoters and the pervasive influence of ethno-nationalist narratives consistently undermined such initiatives.
Other significant impediments included state propaganda, the absence of educational reform promoting reconciliation, and a general lack of conflict-sensitive reporting across both state and non-state media. These systemic issues created an environment unreceptive to independent peacebuilding efforts.
As scholars Nazrin Gadimova and Anush Petrosyan argue, conversations among peace advocates remained confined to a "closed circle" under such conditions. These discussions were ultimately unable to penetrate the wider public discourse, being consistently overshadowed by dominant nationalist rhetoric.
There was a brief opening in the 1990s, the initial years following independence, which allowed for some intellectual exchanges and grassroots diplomacy involving cultural figures. However, these nascent initiatives were gradually stifled by increasing authoritarian restrictions in Azerbaijan and the slow development of an independent civil society in Armenia.
Contrary to more recent assertions, a genuine interest in dialogue did exist historically, but it failed to translate into state policy. This disconnect meant that peace discourse remained largely distant from ordinary citizens, confined to a narrow sphere of NGO workers and activists, rather than fostering a broad societal conversation.
The current peace process continues to exhibit little evidence of an independent civil society robustly shaping or monitoring its trajectory. This absence suggests that while the interactions may appear positive on the surface, their depth and sustainability remain largely contingent upon state direction rather than organic societal demand.
Such state-orchestrated dialogue, while perhaps serving immediate diplomatic signalling, raises questions about its capacity to foster deep-rooted reconciliation. Without genuinely empowered independent voices, these exchanges risk being perceived as performative, lacking the societal foundation required for lasting peace in the South Caucasus.