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Opinion

Russia’s Zakharova says Georgia could be named ‘unfriendly country’ if it joins EU

Maria Zakharova’s recent declaration, that Georgia could be added to Russia’s list of ‘unfriendly countries’ if it pursues European Union membership, offers a stark reminder of Moscow’s persistent efforts to shape the regional landscape. Th

Russia’s Zakharova says Georgia could be named ‘unfriendly country’ if it joins EU

Maria Zakharova’s recent declaration, that Georgia could be added to Russia’s list of ‘unfriendly countries’ if it pursues European Union membership, offers a stark reminder of Moscow’s persistent efforts to shape the regional landscape. This pronouncement, delivered by the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, is far more than a routine diplomatic warning; it is a calculated assertion of influence, reflecting a complex interplay of historical grievances and contemporary geopolitical manoeuvring.

Despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations between Russia and Georgia since the August 2008 conflict, Tbilisi has navigated a path of increasing positive neutrality towards the Kremlin since the onset of the full-scale war in Ukraine. Yet, Georgia steadfastly maintains that official ties cannot be restored until Russia revokes its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This unresolved territorial dispute remains the fundamental barrier, a constant point of friction in the strained relationship.

Zakharova’s subsequent warnings extend beyond mere political posturing, tapping into tangible vulnerabilities. She highlighted the potential blow to Georgia’s tourism industry, linking it to “destructive demands from Brussels” that would inevitably arise from EU integration. This suggests an understanding of the economic anxieties that underpin Georgian public discourse.

Furthermore, the spokesperson alluded to the significant Georgian diaspora in Russia, suggesting EU accession could threaten their ability to maintain normal communication and visits with relatives. This is a pointed appeal to personal connections and social cohesion, demonstrating Moscow’s willingness to exploit deeply human bonds for political leverage.

On the economic front, Zakharova’s statements underscored the prospective loss of Georgia’s preferential trade regime with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. These markets represent Georgia’s primary export destinations, making any disruption a serious concern for the nation’s economic stability and growth.

The prospect of Georgia having to comply with energy embargoes imposed against Russia was also explicitly raised, alongside the threat of broader retaliatory economic measures. Such measures could include the requirement for payments to be made in rubles, further complicating Georgia’s international economic engagements and independence.

We must also consider the ambivalent position of the EU itself. Georgia was granted candidate status in 2023 but subsequently suspended its accession efforts in 2024. EU officials have candidly stated that Georgia is currently a candidate ‘in name only’, and its prospects of joining the bloc under the ruling Georgian Dream party are exceedingly low.

This internal ambiguity within Georgia, coupled with the EU’s own frustrations, provides fertile ground for Moscow to exert its influence. Russia is adept at exploiting the disjuncture between Tbilisi's stated European ambitions and its current government's actions, which often appear to align with Moscow's interests more closely than with Brussels' democratic benchmarks.

Intriguingly, the latest rankings from Russia’s ‘friendliest neighbours’ list saw Abkhazia and South Ossetia top the chart, with Georgia’s own rating increasing from the previous year. This contrasts with a decline for both Armenia and Azerbaijan, painting a broader picture of Russia’s shifting regional alliances and perceived spheres of influence.

Ultimately, Zakharova’s warnings serve a dual purpose. They aim to deter any genuine move towards Western integration while simultaneously reinforcing Moscow’s existing leverage over Tbilisi, particularly in the economic and social spheres. The threats are not merely hypothetical; they are a clear articulation of the consequences Moscow is prepared to impose to maintain its regional prerogatives.

Tbilisi finds itself navigating a precarious geopolitical tightrope, balancing national aspirations with very real economic and social pressures. Moscow, for its part, continues to employ a sophisticated blend of rhetoric and actionable threats, ensuring that Georgia’s path towards Europe remains fraught with internal challenges and external complications.